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30=20: "Understanding"Maximum Sentence
Enhancements
FRANK

R. HERMUANNt

SINTRODUCTION

After a long and hard-fought trial, a jury has convicted your
client of kidnapping. A statute defines kidnapping as the forcible taking or holding of another against that person's will. The
statute permits the court to punish your client by twenty years
in prison for the kidnapping. If the judge at sentencing finds
your client accomplished the kidnapping with a weapon, the
statute permits thirty years imprisonment.
You and your client now stand before the judge who will impose sentence. The judge announces she has read affidavits the
prosecutor supplied her for sentencing. On the basis of those
submissions, the judge believes that your client probably used a
weapon during the kidnapping. She makes a finding that he did
so. You object:
Your honor, I understand I am bound by the jury's verdict with respect
to the kidnapping, although neither my client nor I agree with it. But
the jury said nothing about the use of a weapon. The verdict addresses
only what the indictment charged. The prosecutor did not include any
mention of a weapon in the indictment. Because the indictment did not
raise the issue of a weapon, Your Honor never instructed the jury on the
matter. Had we been given notice, we could have prepared our defense at
trial in light of a complete and formal accusation about the weapon. We
had no opportunity to do so. Moreover, at trial the prosecution called no
witnesses to establish my client used a weapon. Had the prosecutor done
so, I could have vigorously confronted those witnesses and crossexamined them. I also could have called witnesses to refute them. We
had no chance to do that. Had the prosecution charged my client with
using a weapon, due process would have required the prosecution to
carry the burden of proving its charge beyond a reasonable doubt. By
t Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College; A.B. Fordham University, 1969; J.D.,
Boston College Law School, 1977. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful criticisms made of
earlier drafts of this article by Boston College Law School Professors Sharon Beckman,
Michael Cassidy, Phyllis Goldfarb, James Rogers, and Dean Avian Soifer. Most especially, I wish to thank Professor Ingrid Hillinger whose friendship, encouragement, and
expertise made this possible.
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only raising the matter at sentencing, the prosecution hopes to escape
that burden. My client is now deprived of the verdict of a jury on the issue of using a weapon. My client should not lose his due process rights
guaranteed him at trial because the prosecutor chose to raise the use of
a weapon only at sentencing. Consequently, I ask Your Honor either to
disregard the issue of whether my client used a weapon, or to accord my
client all the due process protections he would have had if the prosecution had formally charged him with the use of a weapon.

The sentencing judge responds:
Counsel, your requests are denied. You seem to think we are here to try
your client. We've done that. You lost. We are here now simply to impose
punishment for his crime. The statute allows me to impose a sentence of
twenty years for kidnapping, but thirty years if I find the defendant used
a weapon. I have found your client probably used a weapon. I impose the
maximum sentence of thirty years in prison. Next case.

Was your client entitled to the due process protections of a
criminal trial for the use of a weapon before the judge added ten
years to the defendant's sentence for kidnapping? Appellate
courts say no. This Article argues the contrary. When a statute
permits a court to punish more harshly due to an aggravating
factor than it could without the factor (for example, thirty years
for kidnapping with a weapon rather than twenty years for kidnapping without a weapon), the due process protections of a
criminal trial should apply to the aggravating factor before a
judge can impose the lengthier punishment. This Article will refer to statutes that permit greater punishment for the aggravated commission of a crime as "maximum-enhancing statutes."
The term "maximum" refers to the greatest punishment the
statute permits for commission of the crime in its unaggravated
form (for example, twenty years for kidnapping without the use
of a weapon).
Part I considers the Supreme Court's rationale for refusing
to apply full due process safeguards to other types of sentencing
schemes. This background will reveal the unique quality of maximum-enhancing statutes and establish why the due process
protections of a criminal trial should apply to sentencing under
aximum-enhancing statutes. Part I, therefore, undertakes to
explain courts' rationales to deny criminal defendants full criminal due process under discretionary sentencing, mandatory minimum sentencing, and guideline sentencing. Part II focuses on
maximum-enhancing statutes. It isolates and analyzes the
courts' rationales for denying criminal defendants full criminal
due process under them. Part J- argues that no convincing rationale justifies reduced due process for maximum-enhancing stat-
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utes, no matter what one's views of the due process reasoning
underlying other sentencing structures. Part IH will argue that,
if courts applied full criminal due process protection to maximum-enhancing factors, it is unlikely that legislatures would try
to avoid the safeguards by artful drafting of criminal statutes.
The Article will conclude that courts should apply the full protections appropriate to a criminal trial to findings that enhance
a maximum sentence.
I

THE RATIONALE FOR DENYING DuE PROCESS PROTECTIONS AT
SENTENCING

A.

Williams v. New York:' The Rationale for Denying Due
Process Protectionsat DiscretionarySentencing

A vast difference exists between an accused's rights at trial
and a convicted defendant's rights at sentencing. At trial, a
criminal defendant is entitled to the full panoply of due process
protections: the right to counsel

2

notice of the charges, 3 to com-

process, 4

to confront and cross-examine adverse witpulsory
nesses, 5 to trial by jury,6 and the right to have the prosecution7
prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
After conviction, a defendant stands in a radically different position. These due process guarantees vanish except for the right
to counsel.
A traditional criminal statute defines the elements of a
crime and sets out a maximum penalty permitted for its commission. A judge has the discretion to impose any penalty
within the maximum the statute prescribes. The statute does
not require the judge to make any fact-finding before imposing
sentence. The jury's finding that the defendant committed the
elements of the crime permits the judge, without more, to impose the maximum penalty, if the judge wishes.
The United States Supreme Court set out the rationale for
denying due process claims under discretionary sentencing in
1. 337 US. 241 (1949).
2. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).

3. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 766 (1962).
4. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).

5. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 US. 400, 403 (1965).
6. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399
US. 66, 69 (1970).
7. In re Winship, 397 US. 358, 364 (1970). A defendant is also entitled to the effective assistance of counsel See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335. This is the only trial right that

also attaches at sentencing. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 US. 128, 136 (1967).
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Williams v. New York. 8 The case involved a traditional discretionary sentencing statute. In Williams, a jury had convicted the
defendant of murder and recommended a life sentence. The
murder statute permitted a maximum sentence of death, if the
judge found it appropriate. At sentencing, the judge considered
information the probation department and other sources had
supplied against the defendant. The information included accusations of other crimes for which the defendant had not been
convicted and an allegation that he had a "morbid sexuality."
The defendant had no opportunity to confront, cross-examine, or
rebut the sources who had supplied the information used
against him at sentencing. The judge relied on this information
to reject the jury's recommendation of life and instead to impose
a death sentence. The Supreme Court noted that "[w]ithin limits
fixed by statutes, New York judges are given a broad discretion
to decide the type and extent of punishment for convicted defendants. Here, for example, the judge's discretion was to sentence to life imprisonment or death. 9 The New York statute further provided a sentencing judge could consider "information
about the convicted person's past life, health, habits, conduct,
and mental and moral propensities."10 According to New York
procedural policy, consideration of such factors was intended to
aid judges in intelligently exercising their discretion. New York
permitted its judges to consider such information, even though
it came from sources outside the courtroom and, therefore, from
those whom a defendant had no opportunity to confront or
cross-examine.
Williams challenged the New York sentencing scheme arguing due process entitled him to confront and cross-examine the
sources used against him at sentencing. The Supreme Court rejected Williams's challenge, noting that historically, a sentencing
judge could "exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types
of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and the
extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law,"
including affidavits from persons not appearing in court and the
judge's personal knowledge."' A sentencing judge must select an
appropriate sentence within the maximum limit set by statute.
A judge needs "the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics"12 to perform this task.
8. 337 US. 241 (1949).

9. Id. at 244-45.
10. Id. at 245.
11. See id. at 246.

12. Id. at 247.
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According to the Court, sentencing information helps a
judge decide whether to do what the conviction already entitles
the judge to do. By virtue of Williams's conviction alone, the
judge had the power to sentence Williams to death. He could do
so without any hearing and without giving any reason. 3 Information about Williams's other crimes and his morbid sexuality
simply helped the judge to decide the defendant should die. Absent the information, the judge could still sentence the defend-

ant to death.
The Williams rationale for denying due process claims at

discretionary sentencing fails to address an obvious problem.
The Williams Court blinks away any difference between the

judge who says, "I sentence you to death for this murder" and
the judge who says, "I sentence you to death for this murder be-

cause I believe reports that you committed other bad acts and
have a morbid sexuality." The Williams Court saw no difference

between choosing a punishment on solidly proven grounds and
one based on untested allegations.

The difference, however, is clear to any defendant. For Williams, the difference was between life and death. Williams may
have lived but for the untested information in sentencing affidavits.14 In a defendant's eyes, the reliability of the sentencing in-

formation is as critically important as evidence introduced
against him at trial. For the Williams Court, the sentencing

finding was a "collateral issue"15 not important enough to warrant the due process protections that attach at trial. Only one
13. See id. at 251.
14. Arguably, full due process protections should accompany a finding of such consequence. In fact, Congress has provided extensive procedural safeguards in deathpenalty proceedings. The Federal Death Penalty Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (1994), entities a defendant to notice of aggravating circumstances and a jury determination, based
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factor exists. The Act demonstrates that the provision of greater procedural safeguards does not impose an unmanageable burden on sentencing practice. State death-penalty statutes provide equal or
greater protections. New York provides the right to notice that the prosecution intends
to use evidence of any aggravating factor against a defendant and a unanimous juryfinding concerning any aggravating circumstance, proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See
N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 400.27.7 (McKinney 1997). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3
(West 1995). The Supreme Court, however, has not constitutionalized these statutory
procedural guarantees. The Court continues to rely on Williams for the proposition that
the Due Process Clause is not 'a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure." Williams, 337 US. at 251. The Due Process Clause
does not offer the protections of a criminal trial for sentencing factors, even when death
is the consequence of the sentencing finding. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460
(1984) (holding that there is no constitutional requirement that a jury determine the appropriateness of capital punishment).
15. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
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fact counted. After trial, judges can impose the maximum sentence at their discretion without further ado. "We cannot say
that the due process clause renders a sentence void merely because a judge gets additional out-of-court information to assist
him in the16 exercise of this awesome power of imposing the death
sentence."
The engine driving the Williams Court's rationale was not

logic but experience. Judges need information if they are to exercise their sentencing discretion prudently. The Court feared

over-burdening judges with the requirements of full criminal
due process for sentencing factors. "We must recognize that most
of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in
the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if
information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination." 17 Judges could not tailor
punishment to the individual criminal if the due process safe16. Williams, 337 US. at 252. In 1949, the Williams Court noted "modern concepts
individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge
not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid
adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial" Id. at 247. The
Court cited reformation and rehabilitation of defendants as "important" sentencing goals.
"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law." Id. at 248. Today,
Congress has largely repudiated these goals and once again embraced retribution. The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 lists the purposes of criminal punishment as just punishment, adequate deterrence, and preservation of the public safety. 18 U.S.C § 3553(aX2)
(1994). See also US. SENTENCING GUIDELNES MANUAL, § A (1995). Rehabilitation is the
last consideration. In so far as Williams' holding depends upon the now discarded notions of rehabilitation, Williams' denial of due process protections at sentencing is undermined. "Depriv[ing] sentencing judges of this kind of information" no longer "undermine[s] modern penological procedural policies that have been cautiously adopted
throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimentation." Williams 337
U.S. at 249-50. It is beyond the scope of this Article, however, to argue that full due process protections should apply to discretionary sentencing proceedings.
17. Williams, 337 US. at 250. Justices Rutledge and Murphy dissented. In his dissent, Justice Murphy explained:
The record before us indicates that the judge exercised his discretion to deprive
a man of his life, in reliance on material made available to him in a probation
report, consisting almost entirely of evidence that would have been inadmissible at the trial. Some, such as allegations of prior crimes, was irrelevant. Much
was incompetent as hearsay. All was damaging, and none was subject to scrutiny by the defendant. Due process of law includes at least the idea that a person accused of crime shall be accorded a fair hearing through all the stages of
the proceedings against him. I agree with the Court as to the value and humaneness of liberal use of probation reports as developed by modern penologists, but, in a capital case, against the unanimous recommendation of a jury,
where the report would concededly not have been admissible at the trial, and
was not subject to examination by the defendant, I am forced to conclude that
the high commands of due process were not obeyed.
Williams, 337 U.S. at 253.
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guards of a criminal trial had to accompany each additional
finding made at sentencing. Williams, therefore, drew the due
process line at conviction. A defendant is entitled to full safeguards during trial. Once convicted, the defendant's due process
rights under discretionary sentencing are virtually extinct. 18 So
long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the maximum authorized by statute, judicial reliance on information introduced
at the sentencing hearing does not deprive defendants of their
due process rights under discretionary sentencing schemes. The
judge has the discretion to impose the maximum sentence upon
conviction after trial.
B. Specht v. Patterson: The Limits of the Williams Rationale
Eighteen years after its decision in Williams, the Supreme
Court addressed a due process challenge to a different kind of
sentencing scheme. In Specht v. Patterson,9 the defendant
claimed he was entitled to the due process rights of notice and a
full hearing at his sentencing.20 The defendant was convicted of
taking indecent liberties.21 The conviction carried a maximum
term of ten years. Colorado's Sexual Offender Act,22 however,
permitted a judge to sentence a person convicted of indecent liberties to a term from one day to life as a sexual offender if the
judge found the defendant posed a threat of bodily harm or was
an habitual offender and mentally 1l1.23 These factors were not
elements of the crime of indecent liberties. 24 The Sexual Offender Act permitted the judge to make the additional findings
without affording the defendant the opportunity to be heard.
The defendant had no right to confront or cross-examine wit18. In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), the Supreme Court stated:
The Due Process Clause by its own: force forbids the State from convicting any
person of crime and depriving him of his liberty without complying fully with

the requirements of the Clause. But given a valid conviction, the criminal
defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that
the State may confine him...

I& at 224. Among the rights surviving conviction are the rights to substantial religious
freedom, to access to the courts, and to freedom from invidious discrimination based on
race, and a right not to be arbitrarily deprived of a state-created right. See Wolff v. Mc-

Donnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974).
19. 386 US. 605 (1967).
20. Id. at 607.
21. Id.
22. CoL. REv.STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1 to -10 (West 1994).

23. See Specht, 386 US. at 607.
24. See id. at 608.
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nesses or to present or compel evidence in his behalf.25 The

Tenth Circuit,26 relying on Williams, held the sentencing scheme
did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Circuit Court reasoned that the defendant received all his due process rights at
the time of trial. Upon conviction, he was subject to whatever
loss of liberty the legislature prescribed for his crime.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding the Colorado sentencing scheme violated the Due Process Clause. The Court reaffirmed that, in the discretionary sentencing context of Williams,
the Due Process Clause did not require a sentencing judge to
hold a hearing or permit a defendant to participate in it. "We
held in Williams v. New York... that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not require a judge to have
hearings and to give a convicted person an opportunity to participate in those hearings when he came to determine the sentence to be imposed." 27 However, the Supreme Court refused to
extend Williams to the facts of Specht. Under the Colorado
scheme, Specht received a greater punishment than his conviction for indecent liberties permitted. He was subject to the
greater penalty only because the sentencing judge made an additional factual finding that the defendant was a sexual offender. Because at the sexual offender hearing Specht received a
"magnified sentence,"2 based on a factual finding that was not
an element of the crime for which he was convicted (indecent
liberties), Specht faced a "radically different situation 2 9 than
the defendant in Williams.3" The Supreme Court held Specht
was entitled to a full judicial
hearing before the judge could im31
pose the greater sentence:
At such a hearing the requirements of due process cannot be satisfied by
partial or niggardly procedural protections. A defendant in such a proceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections which

due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings. He must be afforded all those safeguards which are fundamental rights and essential

to a fair trial, including
the right to confront and cross-examine the wit32
nesses against him.
25. See id. at 610-11.

26. See Specht v. Patterson, 357 F2d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1966).
27. Specht, 386 US. at 606.
28. Specht adopted as its own the language the Third Circuit used in United States
ex reL. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966), to strike down a comparable sentencing scheme.

29. Specht, 386 US. at 608.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 609-10.
32. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Gerchinan, 355 F.2d at 312). At the time the
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Some appellate courts have opined that it was the bifurcated nature of the Colorado sentencing proceedings that made
Specht radically different from Williams.3 3 The Specht Court
noted the Colorado scheme made a conviction for indecent liberties the basis for commencing another proceeding under the Sexual Offenders Act. 3 But, for Specht, dividing the hearings into
two was constitutionally significant only because the second
hearing required "a new finding of fact that was not an ingredient of the offense charged" in the first hearing. It would elevate form over substance to conclude due process is satisfied if
the judge imposes the magnified sentence based on additional
fact-finding at one hearing rather than two. 6
C. McMillan v. Pennsylvania:37 Guiding the Discretion to
Punish
Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes restrict the sentencing judge's traditionally broad discretion. The statutes typically describe certain aggravating circumstances concerning the
crime itself or the defendant's background. They require judges
to determine if the designated circumstances were present. If a
judge finds such aggravating facts exist, the judge is no longer
free to sentence anywhere within the maximum range, as under
a discretionary sentencing statute. Rather, the judge must impose at least the minimum sentence prescribed in the statute.
The judge retains the discretion to impose a sentence greater
than, the minimum. The uppermost limit on the sentence remains the maximum term the statute prescribes for the elements of the crime.
Supreme Court decided Specht, it had not yet applied to the States the due process
guarantee of trial by jury. It did so one year later. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US.
145, 149 (1968). Three years after Specht, the Court applied to the States the due process safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Wimship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970).
33. See, eg., United States. v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 1976).
34. See Specht, 386 US. at 608.
35. Id. See also Watson v. Borg, 1995 WL 630002, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Specht v.
Patterson held that a defendant at sentencing has the right of confrontation when sentencing is dependent upon a new finding of fact that was not an element of the offense
for which the defendant was convicted.").
36. In Chandler v. Fretag, 348 US. 3, 10 (1954), the Supreme Court held the Due
Process Clause entitled the defendant to counsel before a judge could magnify the
defendants sentence from three years to life on the basis of additional fact-finding made
at a single hearing.
37. 477 US. 79 (1986).
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For example, assume a kidnapping statute imposes a maximum sentence of twenty years. It also lists the use of a weapon
as an aggravating factor. It mandates a minimum five-year sentence if the aggravating factor is present. If, at the sentencing
hearing, the judge finds the convicted defendant used a gun to
commit the offense, the judge's traditional discretion is cabined.
The judge must, at a minimum, sentence the defendant to five
years.
Must a court afford a defendant the full due process protections of a criminal trial before a judge can impose a mandatory
minimum sentence? According to the United States Supreme
Court, no.38 McMillan v. Pennsylvania involved a due process
challenge to the validity of a state mandatory minimum statute.
The Pennsylvania statute 9 punished the commission of certain
enumerated felonies with at least five years in prison if the
defendant visibly possessed a firearm in the course of the designated felonies. 40 Each of the felony convictions carried possible
maximum sentences in excess of five years regardless of aggravating circumstances. The statute expressly stated that visible
possession was not an element of any of the offenses. 41 It authorized the sentencing judge to find visible possession and permitted the judge to base his or her finding on a preponderance
of the evidence.Y
A jury convicted each of the four defendants of one of the
felonies.4 Each sentencing judge refused to impose the required
statutory minimum, holding the statute unconstitutional." The
cases were consolidated on appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court unanimously concluded the statute did not violate the
Due Process Clause. It reasoned that the legislature did not intend visible possession of a weapon to be an element of any of
the defendants' offenses. Moreover, the sentencing statute did
38. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 US. 79 (1986).
39. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 PA. CoNS. STAT. § 9712 (1982). For the
text of the statute, see McMillan, 477 US. at 81-82 n.1.
40. The felonies designated were murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, or attempts to commit the same. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. §9712(a) (1982).

41. See id. § 9712(b).
42. See id. A legislature may list aggravating factors in the penalty clause of a
criminal statute, or the legislature may create a separate sentencing statute containing
a list of factors which aggravate crimes defined in separate criminal statutes.
43. The defendants were variously convicted of aggravated assault (maximum sentence of ten years), voluntary manslaughter (maximum sentence of ten years), and robbery (maximum sentence of twenty years). See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82, 87.

44. Id.
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not increase the maximum sentence. The statute "merely require[d] a minimum sentence of five years, which may be more
or less than the minimum sentence that might otherwise have
been imposed."4 Arguing before the United States Supreme
Court, the defendants maintained the Pennsylvania statute deprived them of the due process right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt as well as a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial regarding visible possession of a weapon.
The Court in McMillan upheld the constitutionality of the
mandatory minimum act.46 It largely deferred to legislatures to
define the elements of a crime.47 Because the Pennsylvania legislature chose not to include visible possession among the defined elements, visible possession was only a sentencing factor.48
The due process requirements of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt traditionally attach only to the elements of a crime, not to
sentencing factors. "[T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is
charged... °"49
At the core of McMillan's rationale for denying full due process in mandatory minimum sentencing is the Court's view that
a conviction authorizes a judge to impose the maximum sentence. The McMillan Court affirmed the Williams doctrine developed in the context of discretionary sentencing. According to
McMillan, a defendant convicted under a mandatory minimum
statute is not entitled to any more due process at sentencing
than a defendant subject to traditional discretionary sentencing.50 The mandatory nature of the sentence does not change the
due process calculus. 51 A discretionary sentencing process permits the judge to impose a particular sentence based on sentencing findings. A mandatory minimum statute simply requires it.
So long as the mandatory minimum punishment remains within
the maximum the court could impose in its discretion, the
defendant suffers no additional harm.
This assertion rests on McMillan's view that a conviction
strips a defendant of liberty up to the maximum sentence per45. Id. at 83.
46. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91.
47. See id. at 85.
48. See id. at 85-86.
49. See id. at 85 (emphasis added) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 US. 197,
210 (1977)).
50. See id.
51. See id. at 92.
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mitted for the elements of the crime.52 A defendant has already
received full due process with respect to the elements. Without
any surviving liberty interest to protect, there is no longer a
need for due process. So, for example, imposition of a mandatory
term of at least five years based on the use of a weapon would
not deprive a convicted kidnapper of any liberty interest. Conviction alone caused the defendant to lose a twenty-year liberty
interest.
However, McMillan explicitly cautioned: "there are constitutional limits to the state's power [to define the elements of a
crime]. 53 McMillan's deference to the legislature, therefore, was
not absolute. The Court recognized that if a legislature crossed
constitutional limits, due process protections would apply to a
sentencing factor. "In certain limited circumstances," the Court
notes, "the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to facts not formally identified as elements of
the offense charged."M
Although the Court declined to delineate all of the circumstances that might trigger Due Process protections for aggravating factors, it did set down certain express boundaries. The
Pennsylvania statute, the Court observed, remained within due
process boundaries because it did not create any impermissible
presumption of guilt or relieve the prosecution of its burden of
proving guilt, or change the definition of any existing crime. In
addition, as the Court repeatedly noted, a finding of visible possession of a firearm did not subject a defendant to greater punishment than was available for the crime alone.55 It did not expose a defendant to a higher maximum than he or she might
otherwise receive. McMillan's situation, therefore, was not like
Specht's. 56 The Pennsylvania statute merely dictated the precise

weight to be accorded the aggravating factor
within the range
57
permitted for the elements of the felonies.
Section 9712 neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime commit-

ted nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty
within the range already available to it without the special finding of
visible possession of a firearm. [The act] "ups the anter for the defendant
52.
53.
54.
process
55.
56.
57.

See id. at 83-84, 88, 92.
See d., 477 U.S. at 86.
Id. The Supreme Court held in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), that due
requires proof of every element of a crime. Id. at 364.
See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82, 83, 87-88, 89.
Id. at 89.
Id at 89-90.
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only by raising to five years the minimum sentence which may be imposed within the statutory plan.5

D. Another Form of Guided Discretion:Sentencing Guidelines
The appellate courts have applied McMillan's due process
analysis to sentencing guideline schemes.59 Sentencing guideline
schemes specify factors which aggravate a crime. With respect to
these factors, the guidelines function much like mandatory minimum statutes. A court must impose a sentence in a particular
range within the statutory maximum, depending upon the circumstances of the crime and the defendant's criminal history.
So, for example, if a defendant is convicted of kidnapping under
a statute carrying a twenty-year maximum, a sentencing guideline might require a judge to impose a sentence of at least five
years, if the judge finds that the defendant used a weapon to accomplish the kidnapping.60 Arguably, guidelines create a liberty
interest in a sentence below the maximum because a judge is no
longer free under the guidelines to impose the statutory maximum by virtue of the conviction alone, as under discretionary
sentencing. 61 The circuit courts, however, have uniformly
adopted the view that guidelines do not create any liberty interest in a sentence below the maximum.
The following language is typical:
The Guidelines have made the defendant's interest in a fair sentence
more defined and protectable. However, we emphasize that the convicted
defendant's liberty interest is not an interest in the maximum guideline
sentence set by the offense of conviction alone ....
The Supreme Court
has recognized that due process protects a defendant's interest in fair
sentencing, but has emphasized in the same cases that the interest is
not defined as a liberty interest in a sentence below the statutory
62
maximum.
58. Id. at 87-88.
59. See id.; United States v. Vonstein, 105 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Restrepo, 946 F2d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
60. U.S. SENTENcING GUimLNS MANUAL § 2A4.1(3) (1995) mandates a two level increase if a dangerous weapon was used in a kidnapping.
61. For trenchant criticisms of federal sentencing under the guidelines, see
Deborah Young, Fact-findingat Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the
Rules, 79 CoRNELL L. Rnv. 299 (1994); David Yellin, Illusion Illogic, and Injustice: Real
Offense Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REv. 403-(1993);
Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-finding Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L REv. 289
(1992).
62. Restrepo, 946 F2d at 659.
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The appellate courts can largely avoid the question of what
due process rights ought to be afforded the defendant at guideline sentencing, so long as they deny that a defendant retains 63
a
liberty interest in a sentence below the statutory maximum.
Because conviction alone has extinguished the defendant's liberty interest in anything below the statutory maximum, nothing
is left for due process to protect.
II.

THE PROBLEM: WHAT RATIONALE JUSTIFES DENYING FULL

CRIMINAL -DUE PROCESS UNDER MAXIMUM-ENHANCING STATUTES?

One genre of statutes differs markedly from mandatory
minimum statutes and sentencing guideline schemes. Maximum-enhancing statutes, as this Article uses the term, are statutes which permit or require a sentencing court to impose a sentence greater than that available, were the judge to consider
only the elements of the crime." For example, assume a kidnapping statute defines the offense as restraining or taking another
by force or the threat of force. It allows imprisonment for no
more than twenty years if the defendant is convicted of the
crime. However, it permits, or requires, a sentence of thirty
years if the sentencing judge finds the defendant used a weapon
in committing the kidnapping. This is a maximum-enhancing
statute. The sentence is lengthened or "enhanced" over what it
would otherwise be, based on a fact or circumstance described in
the penalty clause of the statute.
63. In Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting), Justice
Souter, joined by Justices White and O'Connor, expressed the view that 'a defendant enjoys an expectation subject to due process protection that he will receive a sentence
within the presumptively applicable range in the absence of grounds defined by the Act
as justifying departure." Id. at 147. But, as the Restrepo court points out, 'the presumptively applicable range is the range established after consideration of all the sentencing
factors set out in the Guidelines, not before' Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 658 n.8.
64. As examples of federal maximum-enhancing statutes, see 18 US.C. § 2113(d)
(1997) (increasing penalty if defendant assaulted victim or used dangerous weapon in
the commission of a bank robbery); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976) (increasing penalty if
defendant used a firearm in commission of a felony); 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1996) (increasing
penalty for car jacking if defendant caused serious bodily injury or death resulted); 21
US.C. § 844(a) (1990) (increasing penalty depending upon amount of illegal drug possessed); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1996) (increasing penalty for unlawful possession of firearm
if defendant was a three time felon); 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (1994) (increasing penalties for
resisting correctional officer if defendant used weapon or caused bodily injury). As examples of state maximum-enhancing statutes, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-221(1) (1978)
(increasing penalty for use of weapon during commission of felony); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 12022(aX) (West 1990) (increasing penalty for use of weapon during commission of
felony); MINN. STAT. § 609.1352(1)(1) (1989) (increasing penalty if offense motivated by
sexual impulse on part of predatory behavior).
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Maximum-enhancing statutes create a sentencing structure
very different from discretionary sentencing or sentencing under
mandatory minimum schemes or guidelines. Under a discretionary sentencing structure, a kidnapping defendant may lose
twenty years of liberty, whether or not he or she used a weapon.
Under a mandatory minimum scheme, a defendant will forfeit
at least five years of liberty if the judge finds the defendant
used a weapon. A guideline may require a convicted kidnapper
to be sentenced more harshly within the maximum allowed for
kidnapping, if the defendant used a weapon. In these instances,
in the prevailing view of the circuit courts, all the safeguards of
a criminal trial precede any loss of liberty the defendant will
suffer by virtue of conviction. The statute set out the maximum
term for the crime and the sentence did not exceed the
maximum.
Can the same hold true for maximum-enhancing statutes?
Under a common-sense view of the matter, the judge adds an
extra term to what the crime alone permits. The judge thereby
deprives the defendant of more liberty than a bare conviction
would entail. What was twenty years for kidnapping becomes
thirty years for kidnapping with a gun. Of course, the motive for
imposing the "enhanced" sentence is apparent. Such a defendant
is worse than one who commits the kidnapping without the aggravating factor. But, however sound the reason for imprisonment, the Due Process Clause guarantees that the state may
not imprison a person for a crime without first according the
defendant all the protections of a criminal trial. 65 How can a
defendant constitutionally suffer the additional loss of liberty
without the due process protections of a criminal trial?

Does the Williams/McMillan approach to sentencing justify
the denial of full due process protections for maximum-

enhancing statutes? McMillan recognized that a statutory
scheme different from discretionary sentencing or mandatory65. "Every person has a fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the Govern-

ment may not punish him unless and until it proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
at a criminal trial conducted in accordance with the relevant constitutional guarantees."
Chapman v. United States, 500 US. 453, 465 (1991). "[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due
process of law" Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Penal statutes may not be applied 'without due process of law and without according [persons] the rights guaranteed
by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, including notice, confrontation, compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses, trial by jury, and assistance of counsel Kennedy v. Rusk, 372
U.S. 144, 163 (1963). When a legislature wishes to punish a person, it "must provide for
a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused." Wong Wing v. United States, 163
US. 228, 236 (1896).
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minimum sentencing might cross the constitutional line and
trigger the safeguards of a criminal trial. Unlike the Pennsylvania statute before the Court in McMillan, maximumenhancing statutes expose a defendant to greater punishment
than the range "already available to [a court] without the special finding of [an aggravating circumstance]." 66 Indeed, the
Court had already held one such statutory scheme violated Due
Process. The Court in McMillan distinguished Specht's maximum-enhancing scheme from the mandatory minimum statute
before it. It did not overrule or limit Specht. It left Specht's reasoning entirely intact. In upholding the constitutionality of the
Pennsylvania sentencing structure, the McMillan Court relied
on the fact that the sentencing factor in McMillan did not increase the maximum punishment. Given this reasoning and McMillan's continuing adherence to Specht, is there any justification for providing anything less than full criminal due process
for sentencing findings under maximum-enhancement statutes?
Courts have offered several justifications but none withstands
close scrutiny.
This Article will now examine the principal theories courts
use to conclude maximum-enhancement statutes do not trigger
the full due process protections of a criminal trial before a judge
sentences a defendant to a term longer than allowed for the elements of the crime alone. The Article will conclude that none of
the theories holds up to scrutiny.
A. It All Depends on What You Call It: "Element"or
"SentencingFactor"--An Attempt to Justify Reduced Due
Process By Characterization
Legislatures have the power to specify certain conduct as an
element of a crime. But not everything a legislature includes in
a criminal statute is an element of the defined crime. Statutes
contain penalty provisions that are distinct from the elements.
The penalty provisions bear on the amount of punishment
meted out for the crime. A legislature may exclude specified conduct from the definition of the crime, making it part of the statute's penalty clause. When a penalty clause describes aggravating conduct, courts will refer to the conduct as a sentencing
factor or an enhancement, not an element of the crime.
A maximum-enhancing statute singles out particular conduct which serves to increase a defendant's punishment over
what it could be without consideration of that conduct. Defend66. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
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ants sentenced under an enhancement statute may receive a
greater penalty than they otherwise could. But for the aggravating conduct, the sentence would be less. Understandably, some
defendants have argued they were denied due process safeguards when they were subjected to an increased sentence
based on conduct described in the criminal statute's penalty provision without the usual due process safeguards associated with
the state's right to deprive a defendant of liberty.
In responding to this challenge, some courts have asked
whether a legislature intended to make conduct an element of a
crime or part of the penalty clause. 67 Conduct determined to be
"merely" a sentencing factor automatically justifies reduced due
process.0 They reason that Winship requires full trial due process only for elements. A sentencing factor is not an element.
Therefore, full due process does not attach to such conduct even
though it increases the defendant's sentence. 69 Characterizing
the conduct as a "sentencing factor" establishes the convicted
defendant's rights or, rather, lack thereof.
This reasoning is flawed. McMillan expressly noted that
facts not formally identified as elements of the offense charged
may trigger due process in some circumstances. 70 The Pennsylvania statute did not fall among those circumstances because
it did not authorize a sentence in excess of that otherwise allowed for the offenses of conviction. Labeling enhancement conduct as a "sentencing factor" begs the real question: does the
factor trigger criminal due process protection? The judicial treatment of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) of the Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act 7 ' demonstrates the labeling approach fails to answer
67. See, eg., United States v. Sotelo-Rivera, 931 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that drug quantity is not element of offense of possession but is relevant only to
penalty provision); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 552 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that

Congress intended serious bodily injury or death to be penalty enhancing factor not element of car jacking); United States v. McGatha, 891 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that Congress intended prior convictions to be sentencing enhancements for illegal possession of firearm).
68. See McGatha, 891 F.2d at 1521; United States v. Segien, 114 F.3d 1014, 1018
(10th Cir. 1997).
69. See Segien, 114 F.3d at 1019 (citing cases).
70. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 856.
71. 21 US.C. § 844(a) (1996). The statute reads, in pertinent part:

It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance ....

Any person who violates this subsection may be sen-

tenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year... except that if he
commits such offense after a prior conviction [for a drug offense], he shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than 15 days but not more

than 2 years ....

Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a person convicted
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this question.
In pertinent part, the Act authorizes a penalty of not more
than one-year in prison if a defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance. 72 But the Act authorizes
imprisonment for not less than five nor more than twenty years
if a defendant possessed more than five grams of cocaine base
(crack).73 Do the criminal due process safeguards of a criminal
trial precede a finding that the defendant possessed over five
grams of cocaine base? To answer this question, the circuit
courts have tried to discern what the legislature intended. 74 Did
Congress want quantity to be an element of the crime or a sentencing factor? A defendant's rights hinge on the proper
characterization.
With so much in the balance, courts examining § 844(a)
have expended a great deal of effort to determine whether Congress intended quantity to be an element or a sentencing factor.
They have parsed the express wording and structure of the statute, its use of titles and paragraph headings, and the placement
of semi-colons. They have reviewed its legislative history. They
have teased out the defined elements of the crime from the statute's penalty provisions. Motivating these efforts is the premise
that legislative intention determines whether or not a defendant
will receive the due process protections of a criminal trial.
United States v. Butler75 is a good illustration of the method
at work. The defendant argued he was entitled to an express
jury-determination following appropriate instructions that he
was in possession of more than five grams of cocaine base.7 The
Ninth Circuit Court meticulously analyzed the statute. It determined that Congress stated all the elements of the § 844(a) defined crime in the first sentence: "It shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly and intentionally to possess a controlled substance.. ."77 The second sentence, according to the court, refers
only to the penalty to be imposed: "Any person who violates this
under this subsection for the possession of a mixture or substance which contains cocaine base shall be imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than
20 years ....

72. See id.
73. See id.
74. For cases interpreting § 844(a) as a sentencing factor, see United States v.
Monk, 15 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Smith, 34 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 1994). But
see, United States v. Puryear, 940 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1991) (element of crime); United
States v. Michael, 10 F.3d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same).
75.

74 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 1996).

76. Id. at 921.
77. I&
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subsection may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not
more than one year ... The third sentence, authorizing a
five- to twenty-year sentence if the mixture or substance "contains cocaine base" in excess of five grams, was also part of the
Act's penalty clause. This sentence "reflect[s] Congress's intent
to direct the district courts to impose more severe penalties if
the controlled substance is cocaine base. 79 In Butler's view, possession of cocaine base was not an element of the defined crime
because it was not included in the first sentence's definition.
Nor did possession of cocaine base comprise a separate crime
80
which would have triggered criminal due process safeguards.
Because "cocaine base" is a sentencing factor and not an element of the defined offense, the defendant was not entitled to a
jury finding and proper instructions on the issue of cocaine
base.""
At no point does the court explain why full due process did
not apply to a factual finding that increased the punishment for
the elements alone. The court determined the legislative label
("sentencing factor") and then deferred to it. The court never explained why that label would obviate the defendant's due process claim. Specht requires due process safeguards when a
defendant's punishment is magnified because of a sentencing
factor.8 2 McMillan indicated a statute should trigger due process
if a sentencing factor increases the maximum. Waving the magic
wand and incanting "sentencing factor," does not make the due
process question disappear.
Other circuits have faced similar challenges to § 844(a). In
fact; the Ninth Circuit in Butler relied upon the Second and
Seventh Circuits as persuasive authority for rejecting the
defendant's claim of denial of due process.A Yet neither of these
opinions explains why the legislature's intended label "sentencing factor" automatically reduces a defendant's due process protections when § 844(a) increases punishment beyond what the
elements alone permit. In United States v. Monk,8 the defend78. Id. at 922.
79. Id.
80. See id If Congress had intended to create a new crime of possession of cocaine
base, it would have inserted a requirement of mens rea, just as it did in the first
sentence.
81. Id. at 924.
82. See discussion supra Part LB
83. Butler, 74 E3d at 922-23.
84. 15 E3d 25 (2d Cim 1994). A jury convicted the defendant of possession of cocaine base, but the judge did not instruct the jury concerning the amount of cocaine base
necessary for conviction.
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ant claimed he was entitled to have a jury determination regarding the quantity of cocaine base he was charged with possessing. The Second Circuit held the first sentence of § 844(a)
defined the elements of the crime. The third sentence simply indicated the punishment.8 As a result, the defendant was not entitled to a jury finding on the amount of cocaine base. 86 The
court's analysis ended when it labeled quantity as "sentencing
factor." It never explained why the label justified the curtailment of due process.
In also rejecting a due process challenge to § 844(a)'s sentence enhancement for quantity, the Seventh Circuit indicated
some glimmer of recognition that labeling cannot end the due
process analysis. In United States v. Smith,87 a jury convicted
Smith of simple possession of cocaine base under § 844(a), but
made no determination of quantity.88 At sentencing, the district
court found Smith possessed more than five grams of cocaine
base and sentenced him to 82 months in prison. 89 But for this
judicial finding, the defendant could not have lost his liberty for
more than twelve months. The defendant claimed on appeal that
he was entitled to a jury-finding on the quantity of cocaine
base.9 The court analyzed § 844(a) in the same manner as the
Second Circuit:
[We cannot accept Mr. Smith's contention that the quantity of cocaine

base possessed is an essential element of possession of cocaine base in violation of [section] 844(a). Instead, we agree with United States v.
Monk . . . which held that quantity is not an element of simple possession of cocaine base under § 844(a).91

However, unlike the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit
went on with its analysis. It looked to McMillan to justify its
conclusion that a jury need not determine the sentencing factor:
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania... the Supreme Court recognized that increasing the penalty for an offense through the use of a mandatory minimum sentence whenever the sentencing judge found that the defendant
"visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the offense was
permissible. The defendant in that case was not confronted with a "radically different situation" from the usual sentencing proceeding .... Nor
85. Id&at 27.
86. Id&

87.
88.
89.
90.

34 F.3d 514 (7th Cir 1994).
Id. at 517.
Id.
Id. at 518.

91. Id. at 517.

1998]

MAXIMUM SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS

195

was the defendant faced with a situation in which the government was

attempting to avoid the mandate of In Re Winship ....Similarly, in this
case Congress "simply took one factor that has always been considered
by sentencing courts to bear on punishment... and dictated the precise
weight to be given that factor. 92

The Seventh Circuit's reliance on McMillan is misplaced. It
adopted the term "sentencing factor" from McMillan, but neglected the context in which it was used. In fact, McMillan's
logic does not apply to the facts before the Seventh Circuit in
Smith. Both McMillan and Smith involved the same ultimate
question: did the defendant lose liberty because of a judicial
finding a jury should have made? In McMillan, the Court held
the Sixth Amendment did not require a jury to find the defendants visibly possessed a firearm. Visible possession was a sentencing factor and, more importantly, the defendants did not
suffer any greater loss of liberty than what they might have suffered for the elements alone. The McMillan Court recognized
that labeling conduct a "sentencing factor" does not fully answer
a petitioner's due process claim. McMillan simply explained why
visible possession, as a sentencing factor, was not entitled to the
criminal trial protections of a jury-finding or proof beyond a reasonable doubt under the Pennsylvania statute. The petitioners'
loss of liberty was within the range allowed for the defined
crime without regard to any aggravating conduct. Therefore, McMillan attributed the defendant's loss of liberty to the crime
alone.
In its analysis of § 844(a), the Seventh Circuit in Smith
adopted the methodology of McMillan and searched for legislative intent. The court concluded that the legislature intended
the quantity of cocaine to be a sentencing factor. The court then
tried to explain why a judge and not the jury could make the
quantity finding. But its analogy of "quantity" to McMillan's
"visible possession" breaks down. McMillan's visible possession
did not result in a loss of liberty beyond what was authorized
for the crime.alone. "Quantity" under § 844(a) does. It increases
the range available to the judge from one year (a misdemeanor)
to five- to twenty-years. The Smith court ignored this crucial difference between § 844(a) and the Pennsylvania statute involved
in McMillan. It was satisfied with attaching the same label, but,
as noted, a label does not explain what justifies increased punishment without the due process protections that precede crimi92. Id. at 520.
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nal punishment. The Smith court mentions Specht only once.93
It correctly notes that McMillan's facts were not like Specht's.
But it fails to take into account that Smith's facts are not like
McMillan's. In Smith, the judicial fact-finding exposed the
defendant to radically different sentencing consequences. In fact,
Smith is like Specht and should trigger the due process safeguards of a criminal trial.
A Sixth Circuit panel exposed the inadequacy of labeling in
United States v. Rigsby. 4 A jury convicted the defendant of unlawfully manufacturing marijuana.9 5 The jury did not determine
whether the defendant manufactured eighty-nine thousand
plants, as the prosecution claimed, or whether, as the evidence
would have allowed, the defendant manufactured only one
plant. At sentencing, the court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant manufactured over one thousand
plants. This additional finding increased the defendant's possible
punishment from five years to a range of ten years to life.96
On appeal, the defendant argued the district court erred
when it failed to advise the jury concerning the significance of
the amount of marijuana. The court had instructed the jury that
"[als far as you are concerned, the number of one thousand marijuana plants in count one is of no significance." 97 The Rigsby
panel acknowledged "the great weight of authority holding that
quantity is not an element of a section 841 offense."98 The panel,
nonetheless, disagreed with that authority, including its own
circuit's controlling precedent.9 9 Rigsby noted that other circuits
reached their conclusion that quantity was not an element of
the offense on the basis that quantity is listed under the penalty
clause of § 841.100 In company with these circuits, Rigsby was
willing to assume that Congress intended to make quantity a
consideration only for sentencing. 101 Nonetheless, Rigsby recognized "we are not required to hold that quantity may be considered for sentencing by the district judge under the preponder93. Id.
94. 943 F2d 631 (9th Cir. 1991).
95. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(aX1), 841(b)(1)(A). Defendant was also charged with carrying a
firearm during a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and illegal possession of a shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Rigsby, 943 E2d at 634.
96. The court sentenced Rigsby to 151 months on the drug counts.
97. Rigsby, 943 F.2d at 641.
98. Id. at 640.
99. Id,
100. Id. at 641.
101. The panel indicated that it doubted the validity of the assumption. See id. at
641 n.6.
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ance of evidence standard merely because it is listed under the
penalty provision."1 2 Rigsby correctly grasped that McMillan retained limits on legislatures. "Legislative bodies do not have the
unfettered discretion to lessen the government's burden of proof
of a criminal charge simply by characterizing a factor as a penalty consideration rather than as an element of the offense."10
On Rigsby's view, allowing a judge to determine quantity undermines the fundamental principle of justice that a defendant has
a right to a jury trial respecting critical facts about the alleged
crime. 1' Rigsby understands that the function of a factor, not its
label, is critical. The finding of quantity exposed the defendant
to "a substantially greater penalty of at least ten years up to life
imprisonment compared to a maximum of five years"10 5 if the
defendant manufactured less than 50 kilograms. Allowing a
judge to find quantity and impose the greater sentence violates
a defendant's right to a trial by jury. Although the Rigsby panel
stood by its reasoning, it was constrained by its own circuit's
precedent,10 6 to affim the defendant's sentence. 107 At present,
the panels voice is a poignant cry in the wilderness.
B. Make the Enhancement Disappear
By labeling particular conduct as a sentencing factor, a
court is implicitly holding that a statute has not created a separate crime. A court may accurately interpret legislative intent
when it finds a legislature intended conduct as a sentencing factor and not a separate crime. It may also be that a "sentencing
factor" should wear that label if that is what the legislature intended. But, whatever its label, a maximum sentence enhancer
appears to punish the conduct that caused the enhancement.
McMillan does not offer any justification for reduced due process in such a case. On the contrary, McMillan upheld Pennsylvania's minimum sentence increase because it did not "alter[ ] the maximum for the crime.' 08 If the legislative label of
"sentencing factor" does not justify elimination of due process
safeguards for maximum sentence enhancers, is there anything
else that does?
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 641.
Id.
Id. at 643.
See id
See United States v. Hodges, 935 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1991).
See Rigsby, 943 F.2d at 643.
v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
MWI

198

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

The First Circuit sought to make McMillan's "beyond the
maximum" principle compatible with reduced due process for
maximum sentence enhancers. In United States v. RiveraGomez,"°9 the First Circuit Court did not merely label the conduct as a sentencing factor. It made the enhanced portion of the
defendant's sentence disappear.
In Rivera-Gomez, the trial court sentenced the defendant to
life in prison for a car jacking in which death occurred. 18
U.S.C. § 2119 provided in relevant part:
whoever, possessing a fire arm... takes a motor vehicle that has been
transported or shipped in interstate commerce from a person.., by force
and violence or by intimidation... shall(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or
both,
(2) ff serious bodily injury... results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any
number of years up to life, or both.110

A jury convicted Rivera-Gomez of caijacking. At sentencing, the
judge found that death had resulted in the course of the caijacking. The defendant attacked the constitutionality of his sentence. He conceded that "death results" is not an element of
carjacking. He claimed that the life sentence punished him for
conduct for which he was not charged."'
The First Circuit examined the wording and structure of the
caijacking statute. In its view, the first section defines the base
offense and the following two sections "clear the way for enhanced sentences if either serious bodily injury or death results
from the commission of the carijacking offense." According to the
First Circuit, Congress did not intend the "death results" provision of the act to be an element of the offense, nor did it intend
to create a new species of caijacking offense (caijacking when
death results). It intended "simply to augment the sentences for
certain aggravated carjackings .... -1
109. 67 F.3d 993 (1st Cir. 1995).
110. Congress has amended the Act to require a specific intent to cause death or
serious bodily harm. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
§ 60003(a)(14), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
111. See Rivera-Gomez, 67 E3d at 1000.
112. See id at 1000-01.
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The court then explained why due process does not require
indictment and proof of a fact that "simply" augments a
sentence:
Having concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3) is a sentence-enhancing factor, we next consider the constitutionality... of appellants life sentence
on count 3 [in which death resulted]. Viewed as a sentence-enhancing
factor, subsection (3) represents a congressional judgment that the punishment for committing the crime of caijacking should be harsher if the
offense, as actually perpetrated, includes conduct that produces the demise of a victim. In this sense, the architecture of the carjacking statute

bears a family resemblance to the design of the federal sentencing guidelines, which make generous use of "sentencing enhancement regimes

evincing the judgment that a particular offense should receive a more serious sentence within the authorized range if it was either accompanied
by or preceded by additional criminal activity." For example, under
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, "this court has repeatedly upheld the inclusion as relevant conduct of acts either not charged or charged but dropped," and authorized resort to that conduct as a sentence-enhancing datum. By like

token, a defendant convicted of drug trafficking will find his sentence enhanced if it turns out that he possessed a dangerous weapon during the

commission of the crime ....
The court analogized an enhancement sentence to a guidelines sentence. Guidelines sentences, the court reasoned, increase punishment on the basis of aggravating factors. A finding
of aggravating circumstances under the guidelines does not require the full safeguards of criminal due process. Therefore, the
court concluded, the safeguards are not required under the
caijacking act either, when it increases punishment on the basis
of aggravating circumstances.
This analogy is flawed. Yes, fact-finding under the guidelines does not require full criminal due process. But that is because any increase the guidelines permit must remain within
the statutory maximum. The guideline sentence is valid, as long
as the statutory maximum is valid. But it does not follow that
the statutory maximum is valid because the guideline is valid.
For example, suppose a statute subjects kidnapping to a
penalty of twenty years. A guideline then requires a sentence of
at least ten years if the defendant used a weapon to accomplish
the kidnapping. Under McMillan, the guideline sentence of ten
years is valid without full due process safeguards for the
weapon finding because the ten years for the weapon remains
within the twenty-year statutory maximum for the kidnapping.
113. 1& at 1000-01 (case citations and statute citations omitted).
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If, however, the statute called for twenty years for kidnapping,
but thirty years for kidnapping accomplished with a weapon, a
guideline range up to thirty years would be valid only if the increased statutory maximum itself was valid. The enhanced penalty upheld in Rivera-Gomez was not within the maximum
guideline range for simple carjacking. The guideline range does
not validate the extra ten years.
Rivera-Gomez's analogy does not explain why the statutory
increase, of ten years in this case, over the sentence available
for the elements can be imposed without full due process safeguards. Indeed, the First Circuit Court went so far as to deny
flatly that "death results" even altered the maximum for the
elements:
Appellant is not being punished for the uncharged crime of murder, but,
rather, he is being punished more severely for the crime of carjacking because his conduct during the commission of the crime led to the loss of a
victim's life. Of course, the burgeoning use of sentence enhancers by Congress and the Sentencing Commission as part of the catechism of punishment poses an obvious danger that, in extreme circumstances, the lagniappe might begin to overwhelm the main course. In all probability,
there are constitutional limits on the way sentencing factors can be
deployed in the punishment of a substantive offense. But that proposition is only of academic interest where, as here, the sentence enhancement scheme "neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty."1 '

How can the court attribute this sentence to the elements

alone when the elements do not permit more than a fifteen-year
term? Life in jail is more than fifteen years in jail. Ask any
defendant. A life sentence for "death results" alters the maximum penalty for the elements of caijacking.
On the basis of McMillan, Rivera-Gomez admits "[i]n all
probability, there are constitutional limits on the way sentencing factors can be deployed in the punishment of a substantive
offense"" 5 But faced with one of those limits, an increase in the
maximum, the Rivera-Gomez court blinked it away. It denied
that the sentencing factor altered the statutory maximum. Apparently, the factor did not increase the maximum, but established a new maximum, still based on the same elements. If this
view is correct, no sentence alters the maximum available for
the elements alone. This approach formalistically respects McMillan's logic but simultaneously guts it of all possible force.
114. Id.at 1001.
115. 1&
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C. The 'Subset" Theory of Enhancements
It is possible to effect the same disappearance using different language. Some courts speak of the enhancers as delimiting
a "subset" or "portion" of defendants whose aggravating conduct
has made them eligible for an "increased" sentence. 116 This "increase," however, is not considered an increase over the base offense for the elements. Rather, it expands the base. The "increase," therefore, is for the elements alone. This difference in
base is justified on the ground that one defendant may commit
the elements of a crime in a more aggravating fashion, or with a
worse character, than another. The "subset" approach, like that
in Rivera-Gomez, acknowledges that an enhanced sentence is
greater than a lesser term (e.g., life is greater than fifteen
years). But both assume the harsher sentence represents punishment for the elements only.
In United States v. Haggerty,117 the defendant challenged his
sixty-six month term of imprisonment imposed under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326. Paragraph (a) of the statute authorized a two-year term
of imprisonment for any deported alien who re-enters the
United States. Paragraph (b), under which Haggerty was sentenced, authorized a twenty-year term, for any re-entering alien
"whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony." Haggerty's indictment did not allege a prior aggravated felony. He claimed the indictment was
invalid for failure to charge an element of the offense for which
he was punished.
The Eighth Circuit had to decide whether the prior conviction was an element of Haggerty's offense or a condition triggering enhancement. The court analyzed the statutory language. It
determined that subsection (a) defined the crime of illegal reentry," 8 and "subsection (b) does no more than single out subsets of those persons reentering the country illegally for more
severe punishment" 9 Because the prior felony was a sentence
enhancer and not a separate offense, the court held the indictment did not have to charge the prior aggravated felony. 0
The Haggerty court did not elaborate on its subset theory.
116. See, eg., United States v. Haggerty, 85 F.3d 403 (8th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Ryan, 9 .3d 660, 667 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995); United States

v. Rush, 840 E2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); United States v. West, 826 F.2d 909
(9th Cir. 1987).
117. 85 E3d 403 (8th Cir. 1996).
118. See id. at 405.
119. Id.

120. See id. at 405-06.
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Indeed, it borrowed the language from other opinions, 2 1 which
also did not explain it. Nonetheless, the theory is alluring.
Under the subset theory, the penalty clause of an enhancement
statute divides the set of all those convicted of the crime into
groups deserving differing punishments. The legislature has not
created one maximum sentence and then particular appropriate
sentences along this range. Rather, the legislature has created
different maximum sentences depending on aggravating factors.
Assume, for example, a legislature imposes a maximum of
twenty years for kidnapping accomplished without a gun and a
maximum of thirty years if the kidnapping is accomplished with
a gun. Under the "subset" theory, the legislature has not increased the penalty for kidnapping when it is accomplished with
a gun. It has simply declared that kidnapping is punishable by
thirty years for the subset of persons who accomplish it by use
of a gun. This legislative sentencing structure, it may be argued,
is analogous to discretionary sentencing. Traditionally, judges
made similar divisions based on their discretion. They divided
defendants into those more and less worthy of punishment, depending on the defendant's character and the way in which the
offense was committed. Full due process was not required for
traditional sentencing procedures. The conviction alone substantially diminished the defendant's liberty interest (or due process
rights) to the extent of the maximum period of confinement.m
Why invoke full due process merely because a statute now
guides the dividing process that previously lay within the
judge's discretion? Indeed, reply the subset theorists, full due
process is not triggered.
This approach leaves something in the shade. Under traditional sentencing, a defendant lost his due process right to liberty to the extent of the maximum sentence under the statute.
Thus, a defendant convicted of an offense carrying a maximum
of twenty years lost his due process right to twenty years of liberty. The source of that loss included any considerations the
judge might entertain about the defendant's character or
method of committing the crime. The entire twenty years was
initially protected by due process but forfeited upon conviction
after a criminal trial. The defendant's liberty beyond the statutory maximum was not threatened. His due process right to that
121. See Ryan, 9 E3d at 667-69 (finding 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) to be enhancement provision); Rush, 840 E2d at 577 (finding Armed Career Criminal Act amendment to possession of firearm statute to be enhancement provision).
122. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
US. 79, 92 n.8 (1986).
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liberty was not lost. But, a maximum-enhancing statute allows
a defendant convicted of a crime whose elements carry a twentyyear maximum (protected by full due process) to lose his liberty
for thirty years because he falls into a "subset." Why are the
defendant's last ten years less protected than the first twenty?
Although the subset theory may not raise due process problems
under traditional sentencing, it fails to explain or justify a
defendant's loss of liberty under an enhancement statute. In effect, the theory is nothing more than a naked assertion that a
state may take a defendant's liberty for aggravating conduct
without full trial due process. Of course, it is possible to assert
the entire thirty years are attributable to the elements alone to
which full due process attached, but this is no more than Rivera-Gomez's denial that a sentencing enhancer alters a
maximum.
D. Deny that McMillan Requires Full Trial Due Process for
Maximum-Enhancements
A court could candidly approach the due process problem
posed by a maximum-sentence enhancer. Rather than escaping
the due process puzzle by ignoring the increase above the maximum, a court could deny that the increase makes any difference
for due process purposes. But such an approach would conflict
directly with McMillan's logic. Nonetheless, several courts have
ventured down this road.
In United States v. Lowe,123 the defendant claimed he was
entitled to a jury-finding before he could be exposed to a maximum-enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal
Act. 124 Rejecting the defendant's claim, the Seventh Circuit asserted that McMillan did not intend its "greater or additional
punishment" analysis to be the sole test of whether full trial due
process attaches to aggravating circumstances.2 5 Admittedly,
McMillan indicated a variety of ways a sentencing scheme
might transgress due process boundaries. It might violate the
presumption of innocence, unconstitutionally lighten the government's burden of proof, or disproportionately punish a sentencing factor. 2 6 But nothing in McMillan suggests a statute would
123. 860 E2d 1370 (7th Cir. 1988).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 924.
125. See Lowe, 860 F.2d at 1379. The Tenth Circuit similarly dilutes the significance of McMillan's language. See United States v. Segien, 114 F.3d 1014, 1019 (1997)
(stating increase over maximum is only one concern of McMillan).
126. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88.
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have to cross every one of these boundaries before it violates
due process. In the Lowe court's view, because the Armed Career Criminal Act did not violate due process in every way possible, it did not violate it at all.
After Lowe, the Ninth Circuit made its attempt to relegate
McMillan's "additional punishment" language to the dust-bin. In
Nichols v. McCormick,1 27 the defendant was convicted of kidnapping and assault. After the sentencing judge found the defendant used a weapon, the judge imposed an additional ten-year
term under a state weapons enhancement statute. The court
could not have imposed such a lengthy sentence without its separate fact-finding concerning the weapon.
On appeal, the defendant claimed his enhanced sentence violated his right to due process and his right to a jury-finding.m
The Nichols court candidly acknowledged that "the Montana
statute, unlike that of Pennsylvania in McMillan, allows the
sentencing court to impose a penalty in excess of that permitted
by the underlying offense." 29 But the court in Nichols considered the defendant's reading of McMillan too narrow. 30 The
Ninth Circuit, like the Seventh in Lowe, took the view that McMillan's "beyond the maximum" limit was just one of several
factors reviewing courts should consider in judging the due process validity of maximum-enhancing statutes. McMillan, Nichols
noted, also cautioned against statutes which redefine elements
of an offense as sentencing factors, and against statutes which
relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving all the defined
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Nichols concluded that because the legislature did not commit the last two sins, it did not
matter that it committed the first. This reasoning takes McMillan's logic off its foundations. Under McMillan, a conviction accompanied by the full protections of a criminal trial strips a
defendant of his or her liberty interest up to the maximum permitted for the offense. McMillan offers no justification for depriving a defendant of liberty beyond the maximum without full
due process protections. Nichols acknowledged that this is precisely what happened to the defendant before it. Rather than
grant the due process protections which McMillan requires, the
Nichols court decided not to take McMillan seriously.
Blithe dismissal of McMillan is no longer possible. A recent
Supreme Court decision dispels any doubt about the importance
127. 929 F2d 507 (9th Ci. 1991).

128. See id. at 509.
129. I& at 510.
130. Id
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of the line McMillan drew around "greater or additional" punishment and suggests that lower court attempts to blur the line
are erroneous. In Witte v. United States,131 the Court explained
precisely why it upheld the statute at issue in McMillan:
Significantly, we emphasized that the statute at issue "neither alters the
maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense
calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing
court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a fire-

arm

...

. That is, the statute "simply took one factor that has always

been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment... and dic-

tated the precise weight to be given that factor .... For this reason, we
approved a lesser standard of proof provided for in the statute.... 7M
A sentence enhancer that increases punishment beyond the stat-

utory maximum goes beyond the boundary established by McMillan. It threatens the defendant's liberty interest and requires
the due process safeguards of a criminal trial.
E. A Special Category:Maximum Sentence Enhancements
Based on PriorConvictions
Recidivist statutes typically authorize, or mandate, greater
maximum sentences if a defendant is convicted of a new crime
and has been convicted of a specified number or kind of prior
criminal offenses. When prior convictions increase the maximum
punishment beyond what it could be absent the prior convictions, judicial reliance on the prior convictions to increase the
defendant's punishment may raise limited due process issues.
For instance, the prosecution's duty to give a defendant notice of
its intent to rely on the convictions and the timeliness of the notice. But beyond these limited questions, the use of prior convictions to enhance punishment does not pose the critical due process issues that enhancements not based on prior convictions do.
Whether a legislature intends a prior conviction to be an element of an offense or simply a sentence enhancer, the defendant
has already received full trial due process for the prior conviction. For this reason, federal appellate courts have rejected
131. 515 U.S. 389 (1995). The defendant was convicted of distributing cocaine. Complying with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the trial judge sentenced him for the cocaine offense and increased his sentence in light of uncharged drug offenses. A grand
jury later indicted the defendant for the same conduct that contributed to his cocaine
sentence. The United States Supreme Court held this did not violate Double Jeopardy.
Id&at 403. See infra text accompanying notes 145-52.
132. 515 U.S. at 401.
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claims that maximum sentence enhancements based on prior
convictions violate due process.'m
Buckley v. Butler'34 illustrates this analysis. The defendant,
after conviction of armed robbery, was sentenced under a Louisiana multiple-offender statute.m The Fifth Circuit explained why
the defendant could receive a higher maximum sentence as a repeat felon without the due process rights that attach to a criminal trial:
[Recidivist statutes] do not relate to determining what the accused has
done, but rather to what the state has previously determined that the
accused has done. And that previous determination must have been a
formal, judicial determination of guilt; and hence one as to which the full
measure of constitutional protections was available. The scheme of the
statutes, therefore, cannot properly be understood as intended or calculated to infringe on the rights attending determination of whether the
accused has engaged in criminal conduct.us

The Fifth Circuit did not rest content after labeling the
predicate convictions as a sentencing factor. The court went on
to explain why full due process need not attach to the maximum-enhancer at issue. The determination of the defendant's
enhancing conduct had previously occurred with full due
process.

The circuit courts have adopted Buckley's reasoning and applied it to maximum sentence enhancements imposed under the
federal Armed Career Criminal Act. 137 That Act penalizes any
person convicted of a felony who received, possessed, or transported any firearm in interstate commerce.1 38 The Act sets a
maximum punishment of five years for the offense. 139 But in the
case of a person with three previous convictions for robbery, or
burglary, or both, the statute mandates imprisonment for at
least fifteen years.140 Reviewing courts now consistently hold
that Congress intended the predicate convictions to be sentence
enhancements only. 41 Because the prior convictions are en133. The Supreme Court has upheld repeat-offender statutes against due process
and double jeopardy challenges. See Moore v. Missouri, 159 US. 673, 677 (1895); Oyler v.
Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
134. 825 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1987).
135. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.1]) (West 1997).
136. Buckley, 825 F.2d at 903.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (West 1997).
138. Id. § 922(g).
139. Id. § 924(aXl).
140. Id- § 924(eXl).
141. See United States v. McGatha, 891 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (listing
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hancements rather than elements of a new crime, the circuit
courts have rejected defendants' due process claims. The indictment need not charge the prior convictions.14 The state need
not prove the convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.14
The defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction concerning
the prior convictions. 1 " The reviewing courts offer more than
mere labeling to justify their rejection of these rights. They emphasize that the defendant's enhancing conduct has already received all the safeguards of a criminal trial. This approach indirectly supports the conclusion that due process rights should
attach to maximum-sentence enhancement schemes.
In United States v. McGatha,14 the Eleventh Circuit labeled
as a sentencing factor the three prior convictions portion of the
Armed Career Criminal Act.'4 The court then explained why it
was unnecessary to submit the sentencing factor to the jury:
The mandatory sentencing provisions of § 924(e), applicable only after

the defendant has been convicted of one of the predicate offenses described in § 922(g), closely resemble a recidivist provision. As with the

typical recidivist provision, the sentencing factors are not submitted for
jury consideration since no additional fact finding is necessary-the

defendant has received the totality of constitutional protections due in
the prior proceeding on the predicate offense.1 47

That the prior convictions received "the totality of constitutional
protections" distinguishes the use of such prior convictions at
sentencing from other conduct described by maximum sentence
enhancers. Requiring full trial due process for the prior convictions would be redundant.
Recidivist sentencing is a type of sentence enhancement.
However, the due process reasoning that supports such recidivist sentencing does not apply beyond its narrow context.1 48 On
the contrary, it underscores the need for full due process protections when the enhancement is based on conduct not proven
with full due process protection.
cases holding Armed Career Criminal Act is a sentence enhancement statute).
142. See United States v. Rumney, 867 E2d 714 (lst Cir. 1989).

143. See United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1988).
144. See United States v. Hawkins, 811 E2d 210 (3d Cia 1987).

145. 891 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1990).
146. Id. at 1525.

147. Id. at 1526.
148. Like the Seventh Circuit in Lowe, the McGatha court rejected McMillan's
"greater or additional punishment" language as the sole test for measuring whether a

sentencing factor becomes an element of an offense. This view is no more valid in McGatha than in Lowe See supra text accompanying note 125.
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F. The Double JeopardyAnalogy
Witte acknowledges the significance of McMillan's "greater
punishment" analysis. The Pennsylvania statute in McMillan
was valid because the defendants' punishment did not exceed
the maximum attributable to the elements of the crimes alone.
Doesn't a statute, then, trigger the full safeguards of a criminal
trial if a sentencing factor results in punishment greater than
the elements permit? The conclusion would seem inescapable
unless the enhanced portion of the sentence is attributable to
the elements alone. If a statute punishes kidnapping by twenty
years in prison but its penalty clause raises the maximum to
thirty years for use of a weapon, is the extra ten years somehow
attributable solely to the elements? If so, no enhancement exists
beyond the base term of twenty years allowed for the elements.
The "extra" ten years is absorbed into the base term and becomes the same as McMillan's enhancement within the maximum. And, as in McMillan, the added ten years would not trigger full criminal due process because the defendant's liberty
interest is attributed solely to the elements.
Witte points to two instances in which "punishment" due to
aggravating factors is not punishment for the factors but punishment for the elements alone. Neither instance explains the
absence of full trial due process for maximum-enhancers.
1. Double Punishment Challenges under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The defendant in Witte was convicted of distribution of cocaine. Witte had also distributed drugs on three previous related occasions, although he was never indicted for those
offenses. Nonetheless, at sentencing, the court took into account
Witte's earlier conduct and tripled his sentence, as the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines direct. A grand jury later indicted Witte
for the same three drug offenses that had increased his sentence. Witte claimed he was in jeopardy of being punished twice
for the earlier conduct. The Court rejected his claim. "Where the
legislature has authorized ... a particular punishment range
for a given crime, the resulting sentence within that range constitutes punishment only for the offense of conviction for purposes of double jeopardy inquiry." 149 In effect, the sentencing
judge did not punish Witte for the earlier conduct when it tripled Witte's sentence. He was punished only for his conviction.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the reasoning
it used to validate repeat-offender statutes challenged on double
149. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 403 (1995).
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punishment grounds. Recidivist statutes, the Court in Witte explained, increase the penalty for the latest crime only. No portion of the increased punishment is attributable to the earlier
crimes. The enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense
"is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes," but instead as "a stiffened penalty
for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one"15
A recidivist defendant, therefore, is not punished twice for
the same conduct. By parity of reasoning, Witte was not in jeopardy of being punished twice for his earlier drug-related conduct. He was never punished once for it. For double jeopardy
purposes, all of his sentence, just like all of a recidivist's sentence, is attributable solely to his conviction. The defendant is
"punished only for the fact that the present offense was carried
out in a manner that warrants increased punishment."' 51
If, for double jeopardy purposes, a recidivist defendant's enhanced punishment is attributable solely to the elements of his
latest crime, should an enhanced sentence be attributed solely
to the elements for due process purposes? If a maximumenhanced sentence is not "punishment" for the enhancing factors, then a defendant has no liberty interest at stake when a
judge considers the factors. Without a liberty interest, there
would be nothing for the Due Process Clause to protect. If a
maxmnum-enhanced sentence is attributable solely to the conviction for purposes of due process as well as double jeopardy, then
the due process puzzle is solved.
The Court in Witte, however, was careful to restrict its punishment allocation to an analysis of the appellant's Double Jeopardy claims. 2 The Court understood that what is reasonable for
one purpose may be indefensible for another. Different questions
require different answers. A double-punishment claim looks to
whether a defendant was or might be punished. When a defendant has committed previous crimes and stands for sentencing on
a new offense, a judge has sound reason to increase the punishment for the latest conviction. Earlier punishment did not deter
150. Id. at 410.
151. Id at 401-03.
152. In a concurring opinion, Justices Scalia and Thomas reject Witte's double jeopardy logic: "We do not punish you twice for the same offense," says the Government, "but
we punish you twice as much for one offense solely because you also committed another
offense, for which other offense we will also punish you (only once) later on." I& at 407.
Justices Scalia and Thomas would hold the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect
against double punishment.
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the defendant. In punishing a repeat-offender more harshly for
the most recent offense, a judge is not punishing the earlier offenses again. Recidivist cases, therefore, allocate all of a defendant's sentence to the latest offense for double punishment
purposes.
The Court treated a recidivist's sentence differently, however, when a defendant challenges a sentence on due process
grounds. Here the question is not whether a judge has already
punished a defendant. The issue is how much process was due
before the judge could impose the penalty. When the potential
penalty exceeds the maximum available for the elements of conviction, the Supreme Court has recognized that the defendant
retains a liberty interest in the additional term of years. In
Specht v. Patterson, as noted earlier, 153 the defendant was convicted of a sexual offense carrying a maximum possible sentence
of ten years. A state sentencing statute made him subject to a
possible sentence of life imprisonment if, in addition to his
crime, he was found to be dangerous or an habitual offender.
The sentencing statute did not create a new crime. Thus, from
Witte's point of view, Specht's entire sentence could be attributed to the elements of his conviction for double jeopardy purposes. Nevertheless, the Court in Specht held that Due Process
entitled the defendant to the safeguards of a criminal trial
before a judge could impose a separate sentence based on the
sentencing factor. The Specht Court did not allocate the defendants sentence to his conviction for due process purposes. Thus,
Specht establishes that a convicted defendant retains an interest
in not being deprived of liberty beyond the maximum term prescribed for the elements alone.
2. McMillan's 'Necessary Implication." Witte cites McMillan as a second instance when the court allocated the entirety of
a sentence to the elements of conviction. In McMillan, it will be
recalled, a Pennsylvania statute mandated a five-year sentence
for certain felony convictions if a judge, at sentencing, found the
defendant visibly possessed a weapon during the commission of
the felony. Witte, referring to sentencing factors as "offenderspecific information," drew an implication from McMillan:
[Bly authorizing the consideration of offender-specific information at sentencing without the procedural protections attendant at a criminal trial,
our cases necessarily imply that such consideration does not result in
These decisions [double punishment
"punishment! for the conduct ....
153. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
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challenges to recidivist statutes and McMillan) reinforce our conclusion
that consideration of information about the defendant's character and
conduct at sentencing does not result in "punishment" for any offense
other than the one of which the defendant was convicted.1

This statement acknowledges that a defendant is entitled to
"the procedural protections attendant to a criminal trial" if the
defendant will be punished for a sentencing factor. Witte indicates the McMillan Court was bound to accord its petitioners
complete criminal due process if the petitioners' sentences constituted punishment for visible possession of a weapon. McMillan, as Witte correctly noted, held that the Pennsylvania statute
punished the defendants only for the elements of their crimes.
The act did not punish them for visible possession, even though
the possession finding triggered a five-year minimum penalty.
McMillan's allocation of the petitioners' entire punishment to
the conviction alone is formally defensible only because, as McMillan "significantly" acknowledges, the five-year term was
within the maximum punishment already available to the judge
for the conviction alone. Every moment of liberty lost, therefore,
could be attributed to facts found with the protections of full
criminal due process. No sentencing findings were necessary to
deprive the defendants of their liberty. In the case of maximumsentence enhancers, however, attribution of the whole punishment solely to the conviction is not tenable. The judge cannot
impose an increased maximum solely on the basis of facts found
with the full safeguards of a criminal trial. Additional factual
findings are necessary. When these findings increase the sentence above what the jury's verdict would permit, the defendant
loses more liberty than the conviction alone authorizes. In the
context of maximum-enhancing statutes, the allocation of a
defendant's entire sentence to the conviction alone represents a
gratuitous refusal to grant the safeguards of a criminal trial to
a defendant's potential deprivation of liberty.
G. When the Tail Wags the Dog: Sentencing Findings that
Require the Due Process Protections of a Criminal Trial
Appellate courts refuse to apply the due process protections
of a criminal trial to "sentencing factors." The courts hold a sentence punishes a defendant solely for committing the elements
of the crime. No part of the sentence punishes a defendant for
the conduct that enhanced the sentence. This is so, courts hold,
154. Witte, 515 US. at 400-01.
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even when punishment is greater than the simple elements of
the crime permit. The Supreme Court in Witte indicated the due
process consequences of this formalistic position: "[B]y authorizing the consideration of offender-specific information at sentencing without the procedural protections attendant at a criminal
trial, our cases necessarily imply that such consideration does
not result in 'punishment' for such conduct."5 5 That is to say, if
consideration of sentencing factors resulted in punishment for
the factors, the procedural safeguards of a trial would have to
preface any punishment.
In one extreme circumstance, the Supreme Court has indicated a readiness to abandon its allocation of a sentence solely
to the elements of a crime. In McMillan, the Court noted Pennsylvania's mandatory minimum statute gave "no impression of
having been tailored to permit the visible possession finding to
be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense' 116 The
statute merely raised to five years the minimum sentence which
a judge could impose within a twenty-year maximum. This did
not cross the constitutional line. However, the McMillan Court
indicated the result might be different if the weapon finding disproportionately influenced the sentence. The Court did not indicate when a sentencing factor's influence becomes disproportionate, or how an appellate court can recognize the disproportion.
Perhaps, if Pennsylvania's statute required the weapon finding
to trigger a minimum of fifteen years out of a possible twenty,
rather than just five years out of twenty, the Court would have
held the weapon factor played such a disproportionate role in
sentencing that the tail wagged the dog. It would have acknowledged the punishment was for the aggravating conduct and not
just for the elements of the crime. In Witte, the Court cautiously
reserved the question of whether "the enhancing role played by
the relevant conduct [was] so significant ... that consideration
of that conduct in sentencing has become 'a tail which wags the
7
dog of the substantive offense,
The Court's concern with possible disproportionality shows
the Court is aware its formalism has limits. It will have to
abandon the position that a sentence punishes only the elements of a crime when reality makes clear the punishment is
for the aggravating conduct. 5 8 Disproportionality is one way to
155. Witte, 515 U.S. at 400.
156. McMillan , 477 U.S. at 88.
157. Witte, 515 US. at 403. The defendant raised no disproportionality claim based
on due process. He relied only on a double jeopardy claim.
158. In practice, disproportionality claims have not been successful. See, e.g., Lom-
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force the recognition. It may be the only way in the case of statutes such as Pennsylvania's. Where the aggravated punishment
(five years) remains within the maximum available for the elements (twenty years), there may be no way to tell the punishment is really for the aggravating conduct, unless the conduct
disproportionately enhances the sentence. In the case of maximum-enhancing statutes, however, there is no need to depend
-upon disproportionality to clarify the purposes of the punishment. As soon as a punishment exceeds the term prescribed for
the elements alone, the excess punishment must be for the conduct. Otherwise, a court could not impose it. Once it is clear the
punishment is for the conduct, the safeguards of a criminal trial
are required, as Witte necessarily implies.

HI.

AN OBJECTION TO DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR MAXIMUMENHANCED SENTENCING

If courts were to acknowledge that criminal trial safeguards
must precede maximum-enhanced sentencing, it may be objected
that a legislature might try to circumvent the demands of due
process by a simple expedient. A legislature could abandon maximum-enhancing statutes and revert to traditional discretionary
sentencing. It could expand the maximum penalties available for
the elements alone. For example, instead of penalizing kidnapping by twenty years imprisonment and kidnapping with a
weapon by thirty years, a legislature could punish kidnapping
itself by thirty years. In such case, under the Williams rationale
applied to discretionary sentencing, due process protections
would not attach to the sentencing finding. The defendant could
lose thirty years of liberty on the basis of the conviction alone,
whether or not he used a weapon. If a legislature can escape
due process safeguards by artfully drafting its statutes, why put
the legislature to the trouble in the first place?
In fact, a legislature is unlikely to abandon maximumenhancing statutes in an attempt to avoid due process protections. The graded structure of maximum-enhancing statutes
serves a desirable purpose. It protects less culpable defendants
from excessive punishment when they commit only the unaggravated crime. Maximum-enhancing statutes reserve harsher punishment for the worse criminal. If a legislature expanded the
penalties available for the simple elements of a crime, it would
bard v. United States, 102 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S.Ct. 2437 (1997). For
criticisms of the standard, see Herman, supra note 61, at 334; Young, supra note 61, at
339.
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create greater penalties than it deems appropriate for the simple elements merely to avoid complying with the mandates of
the Due Process Clause. Would legislators expose themselves, or
their families, or members of their own electorate, to life imprisonment for possessing any amount of cocaine, just to deny the
safeguards of criminal trial to those who possess great
amounts? 5 9 The "continued functioning of the democratic process" 160 provides some assurance that legislatures will not increase penalties in order to make an end-run around due process guarantees. A legislature can harshly penalize serious
criminals without placing less culpable citizens at risk of draconian punishment. It can maintain the graded structure of maximum-enhancing statutes. But when it does so, the protections of
a criminal trial should attach to the enhancing conduct.
CONCLUSION

Appellate courts have failed to justify the denial of criminal
due process protections at sentencing for maximum-enhancing
conduct. Judicial efforts to analogize maximum-enhanced
sentences to punishment under discretionary statutes fail. An
increased maximum sentence cannot be attributed solely to the
elements. Perhaps in the rush to "lock up criminals," courts
have forgotten that thirty is more than twenty and always will
be. The elements alone do not permit the longer sentence. The
increased portion is punishment for the aggravated conduct that
causes the increase. Characterizing the aggravating conduct as
a "sentencing factor" does not change the reality of what the
punishment is for. A defendant sentenced to thirty years for kidnapping with a weapon, who could only be sentenced to twenty
years for kidnapping without a weapon, is punished with ten
years for using the weapon. Call the weapon use an "element;"
n " Unless the due process protections
call it a "sentencing factor.
of a criminal trial have preceded the finding that caused ten additional years of punishment, the finding deprives a defendant
of liberty for criminal conduct without the safeguards of a criminal trial.
159. "Petitioner does not argue that the range fixed by Congress is so broad, and
the enhancing role played by the relevant conduct so significant that consideration of
that conduct has become 'a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense." Witte,
515 US. at 403 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88).
160. See McMillan, 477 US. at 93 (Marshall, J., dissenting), (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the democratic process will restrain legislatures from circumventing due process).
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Granted, a defendant may belong to a "subset" of convicts
who deserve additional punishment. Worse criminals deserve
heavier penalties. But criminal trial protections should attach in
determining whether an accused is a worse criminal deserving a
greater penalty than the crime otherwise permits.
Judicial formalism attributes all punishment to the elements of a crime. Consequently, legislatures can create two
crimes but call them one. The first is composed of the simple elements the legislature defines. Full due process protections apply to finding those elements. But when a defendant receives a
maximum-enhanced sentence, the court imposes punishment for
a second, greater crime. Formalism denies the existence of the
second crime. It perceives "a mere sentencing factor." Defendants have better eyes. They see they are punished for aggravating conduct that a court found without the due process of law.

